U.S. Department of Labor

Office of Inspector General Washington, D.C. 20210



July 31, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DAWN M. LEAF Chief Information Officer

Elevit P. Rewin

FROM:

ELLIOT P. LEWIS Assistant Inspector General for Audit

SUBJECT:


Information Security Concerns Report Number: 23-15-009-07-725

In light of recent events involving serious breaches of government data systems, this memorandum highlights three significant deficiencies that have been repeatedly identified in our reports on the Department of Labor's (DOL) information security program. DOL must make it a high priority to mitigate these serious security vulnerabilities to its information systems. These three significant deficiencies are:

- Access controls
- Third-party oversight
- Configuration management

DOL has initiated corrective actions to address these deficiencies as OIG has identified them during our annual Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) testing of subsets of DOL systems. However, this trend of recurring deficiencies is indicative of systemic issues that require an overall strengthening of DOL's information security program to prevent future occurrences.

The following chart shows when we have raised these significant deficiencies over the past five years.



In addition to making recommendations related to the three significant deficiencies described above, OIG has made recommendations to correct control deficiencies across numerous control families, including contingency planning, security assessment and authorization, risk assessment, and incident response.

Summary of Three Significant Deficiencies

Access Control

One of the most frequently identified deficiencies has been in the area of access controls. Access control deficiencies have been cited in each of the 11 Semiannual Reports to Congress that OIG has issued over the past 5 years. Access controls are preventative measures established for the purpose of determining the allowed activities of legitimate users and restricting users' access to system resources.

OIG has repeatedly recommended DOL improve this important control to prevent unauthorized access to DOL systems and applications. OIG recommended in September 2012 that DOL continue to plan and implement logical access via Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards to achieve compliance with Department of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12. DOL only recently began implementing this requirement in response to the Office of Personnel Management breach. Had DOL implemented the requirement earlier, it could have prevented unauthorized access to DOL's computer networks and systems by 11 separated employees who still had active accounts after their departure. Moreover, by not implementing this control earlier DOL unnecessarily exposed itself to greater risk of unauthorized access. Finally, if the rollout had not been delayed, DOL may have been better positioned to more efficiently use the resources necessary to accomplish this significant effort more timely and with less disruption to agencies.

Deficiencies Identified in the PIV System

Deficiencies identified in the PIV system related to issuance of PIV cards and creation of individual profile information and pins:

- September 7, 2012 OIG's Alert Memorandum, DOL Needs to Take Immediate Action to Correct Security Weaknesses in the PIV-II System, identified serious control deficiencies in the areas of account management, system login, system privileges and agreements, system security assessments, system training, contingency planning, system security plan, system rules of behavior, and configuration management. Taken individually, these deficiencies were very serious. Taken as a whole, their impact on the PIV-II security program placed DOL at a high risk for harm to infrastructure, systems, data, employees, contractors, and visitors.
- March 29, 2013 OIG's report, Department's Information Technology Security Program Is Weakened by Deficiencies, noted PIV-II security program weaknesses continued as a significant deficiency for the DOL IT security program because of the substantial and pervasive risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of mission critical and sensitive data.

The importance of the PIV-II security program cannot be understated. The program plays a key role in protecting DOL's infrastructure, including data, other systems, and people from potential harm caused by unauthorized access. Although DOL is now implementing logical access via PIV cards, it will need to ensure all aspects of PIV card issuance and maintenance are properly administered in order to ensure the effectiveness of this control.

Other Access Control Deficiencies Identified

Additional access control deficiencies identified include improper account management, unauthorized privileged users, undocumented rules of behavior, no lock-out after unsuccessful log-in attempts, and outdated system security plans. These deficiencies and others have been identified in numerous reports:

 March 30, 2010 – OIG's report, Actions Required to Resolve Significant Deficiencies and Improve DOL's Overall IT Security Program Major Information System, highlighted that 17 major information systems contained 93 terminated user accounts that were not disabled or deleted within the required time period. Of the 93 user accounts not terminated in a timely manner, 42 were still active at the time of the audit.

- September 21, 2011 OIG's report, Significant Deficiencies Persist in DOL's Information Security Program, noted that during access control testing, prior to the agency and OIG agreeing to stop escalation of privileges, OIG auditors reached a point where they could have obtained unauthorized, administrative system-level access to production systems containing PII.
- March 19, 2012 OIG's report, Federal Information Security Management Act Departmental Security Issues, stated that OIG determined 95 separated employees retained access to network accounts after their departure for 9 of the information systems tested.
- March 31, 2015 OIG's report, Cyber Security Program Improvements Are Needed to Better Secure DOL's Major Information System, showed separated user accounts were not removed in a timely manner. The report also stated users were granted privileged access without proper supervisory approval and rules of behavior acceptance, and a disabled account had been accessed inappropriately 52 days after the account end date.

Third-Party Oversight

Third-party oversight, which is oversight of parties that either own and operate systems on behalf of DOL or operate DOL-owned systems, has been cited as an issue in 8 of 11 Semiannual Reports that OIG issued to Congress over the past 5 years. These deficiencies included: physical and logical access controls not in place, improper use of shared accounts, system security assessments not performed, business impact assessments not performed, untested contingency plan, interconnections not fully documented, and agreements not in place. The following OIG Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) audits have identified a persistent pattern of third-party oversight deficiencies:

- March 30, 2010 OIG's report, Actions Required to Resolve Significant Deficiencies and Improve DOL's Overall IT Security Program Major Information System, highlighted that DOL had not designed specific testing and monitoring policies or procedures for use by DOL system owners, Designated Approval Authorities, or contracting staff. These policies and procedures are needed to ensure compliance with minimum IT security requirements by third-party organizations operating or managing DOL IT systems.
- September 21, 2011 OIG's report, *Significant Deficiencies Persist in DOL's Information Security Program*, noted the magnitude of third-party

oversight findings and the severity of their potential harm to systems, information, services, facilities, and people, required immediate actions by management to strengthen oversight of third-party providers and related systems.

- September 27, 2012 OIG's report, Department's Information Technology Security Program Is Weakened by Deficiencies, found 21 control deficiencies within a third-party operated system. These deficiencies included: lack of physical and logical access controls, improper use of shared accounts, not performing system security assessments, not performing business impact assessments, not testing the contingency plan, not fully documenting interconnections, and not having agreements in place for interconnections.
- March 29, 2013 OIG's report, Department's Information Technology Security Program Is Weakened by Deficiencies, emphasized DOL lacked specific policies and procedures to ensure adequate oversight of third parties that either owned and/or operated systems on behalf of DOL or operated DOL-owned systems. OIG's testing of two contractor systems identified substantial and pervasive risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of mission critical and sensitive data.
- March 31, 2015 OIG's report, Cyber Security Program Improvements Are Needed to Better Secure DOL's Major Information Systems, again found concerns with third-party systems. The report identified three major information systems operated on behalf of DOL with controls that were not operating as intended, as well as an overall lack of monitoring of the third-party service providers in two of those major information systems.

Inadequate third-party oversight also caused deficiencies in other control families, such as configuration management, incident response, background investigations, certification, accreditation, and segregation of duties. Government personnel oversight for contracted system services is required to maintain effective IT security controls. The lack of this oversight may cause specific security controls to remain unimplemented or ineffective.

Configuration Management

Configuration management has been reported as a recurring issue in the Semiannual Report to Congress four times over the past five years. The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, *Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,* describes configuration management as a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of information technology products and information systems by controlling the processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems throughout the system development life cycle.

 March 31, 2015 – OIG report titled, Cyber Security Program Improvements Are Needed to Better Secure DOL's Major Information System, found DOL lacked a process for the timely and secure installation of software patches and remediation of configuration-related vulnerabilities. Out of 20 specific deficiencies identified in the audit, 7 were within the configuration management control family.

Maintaining proper configuration management ensures integrity of information systems through a process for timely and secure installation of software patches and remediation of configuration related vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

We recognize DOL has developed Plans of Action and Milestones intended to remediate known information security vulnerabilities, and has completed numerous actions. Most recently, the United States Chief Information Officer instructed DOL and other federal agencies to immediately take a number of steps to protect federal information and assets and to improve the resilience of federal networks. As part of this effort, DOL is now working to implement multi-factor authentication for all DOL systems. However, we remain concerned that despite the reported progress in taking corrective actions, our audits continue to identify similar deficiencies in information security. Moving forward DOL needs to focus its efforts on enhancing its information systems and data.

Recommendations

To further improve its information security program, we recommend DOL's Chief Information Officer: (1) place a focus similar to the PIV card implementation on implementing corrective actions related to the areas of significant deficiencies where we have repeatedly identified weaknesses; and (2) take a proactive approach in assessing security controls and correcting identified deficiencies across all DOL systems.

We request you respond to this memorandum within 10 business days. If you have any questions, please contact Keith Galayda, Director, Information Technology Audits at 202.693.5259.

cc: T. Michael Kerr Ed Hugler Tonya Manning Nancy Rooney U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management Washington, D.C. 20210



AUG 1 4 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ELLIOT P. LEWIS Assistant Inspector General for Audit

FROM:

DAWN M. LEAF Chief Information Officer

SUBJECT:

Management Response to the Office of the Inspector General Fiscal Year 2015 Audit Report entitled: Information Security Concerns, Report Number: 23-15-009-07-725

This memorandum responds to the above-referenced Fiscal Year 2015 audit report dated July 31, 2015. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) summarized previously issued significant deficiencies in the areas of Access Control, Third Party Oversight and Configuration Management resulting in the issuance of two general recommendations.

The security of our information systems is one of the Department's highest priorities, and we are committed to ensuring that the Department implements safeguards to protect its systems and manage identified security risks. While DOL's pursuit of these remediation activities has been aggressive and unyielding, we will redouble efforts in accordance with the recommendations in your report.

Management acknowledges the perspective expressed in OIG's originally cited findings and articulates the same concerns stated in previous management responses. Previously, management has made the point that the audit reports do not provide the requisite linkage between the findings and risks or events that could be expected to rise to the level of seriousness contemplated by the term "significant deficiency," as defined by OMB.

Also relevant is the status of the OIG's prior recommendations reviewed in this report. In some instances, the OIG performed remediation testing and confirmed that corrective action had been completed for many of the outstanding weaknesses and closed out the associated recommendations. In other instances, the planned corrective actions are longer-term and are still in-progress. In these instances, the OIG has accepted these remediation plans as sufficient, with closure pending OIG verification.¹ In the interim, DOL's policies, procedures, and its physical and logically separated systems with supporting boundary controls collectively provide appropriate mitigating safeguards and redundant security measures.

¹ Attached is a crosswalk of the previous OIG reports referred to in the OIG's July 31, 2015 report cataloguing the status of the recommendations, as classified by OIG.

That being said, management appreciates the OIG's attention to information security. In particular, the

Department and the OIG can collaborate to improve information security. In that instance, management acted with urgency

Management's response to the report's recommendations related to Access Control, Third Party Oversight and Configuration Management follows.

Access Control

Management concurs that Access Control is one of the most frequently cited and important aspects of recent OIG audit reports and agrees that this needs to be addressed. However, we have concerns with the completeness and accuracy of the subject report.⁴ In some cases, several isolated access control related issues have been extrapolated from the various reports and combined with dissimilar issues to suggest a problem larger in scope than that is demonstrated by the analysis. Also, the statement: "DOL only recently began implementing this requirement in response to the Office of Personnel Management breach" does not acknowledge the fuller context of what the Department has done to improve access controls.

DOL had directed component Agencies to address system specific access control related issues well before the OPM breach occurred. For example, on August 14, 2012, DOL Agency Heads were briefed on the Departmental Risk Management strategy which highlighted the importance of addressing the identified deficiencies for access controls.

Following this briefing, on August 23, 2012, the Agencies' ISOs received Plan of Action and Milestones Training with a specific focus on addressing Departmental significant deficiencies. In parallel with these efforts, the Department initiated a comprehensive Enterprise Identity and Access Management (IAM) program to address systematic access control issues. This was communicated in previous management responses to the OIG and outlined in the DOL Plan of Actions and Milestones.

The Department's IAM Program, originally initiated in 2011, was re-planned in the spring of 2013 in part because a Federal Identity Credential and Access Management (FICAM) standard change rendered the selected product non-compliant. The project was re-initiated in November 2013 and officially chartered and approved by the DOL IT Project Review Board in FY 2014 Q2. The overall objective of the IAM program is to strengthen DOL's security posture by implementing an Identity Management (IdM) solution that will automate account management processes and enable user-based PIV Card authentication for all users to all DOL systems, including DOL cloud-based systems (e.g. Cloud email). Progress for DOL's Identity and Access

⁴ Fiscal Year 2015 Audit Report entitled: Information Security Concerns, Report Number; 23-15-009-07-725.

Management program was impacted by Sequestration program budget cuts in late calendar 2013, FY 2014. However, despite funding reductions, in August 2014, DOL procured PKI Managed Services and successfully updated the DOL's Active Directory Infrastructure to support userbased PIV card logon functionality. Subsequent to the PKI implementation, DOL's FY 2015 IT Modernization budget was cut in the FY 2015 enacted budget, directly impacting the DOL IAM program funding.⁵ In response, the project was re-baselined at a reduced level of effort focusing on the implementation of machine-based PIV Card logon for general users and user-based two-factor authentication for its privileged users.

By way of a September 7, 2014 Alert Memorandum, the OIG cited several significant security issues for the **Several auditor misunderstandings about the Several auditor plan to address the identified deficiencies. The Corrective Action Plan called for the establishment of an Integrated Project Team that was chartered with responsibility to implement all required actions outlined in the Corrective Action Plan and to develop and implement a strategy that would enable DOL to leverage GSA's USAccess shared PIV services. The Several Several Several to close the majority of the identified weaknesses, and we have provided evidence to the OIG to verify closure of others. DOL also began leveraging GSA's USAccess shared PIV services and plans to be fully migrated within the next two years. Satisfied with management's actions, OIG classified the issue "resolved," with closure dependent on confirming completion of management's corrective action plans.**

It is important to recognize that DOL-- both at the Departmental and Agency level -- has reallocated a tremendous amount of resources from other critical efforts to accelerate the program to support the Federal "CyberSecurity Sprint" targets. This effort has required technical and logistical assistance from OMB, OPM, and GSA, and diverted substantial resources, amounting to thousands of hours of staff time, to obtain the necessary credentials and equipment. Despite having no additional resources to undertake this project, the Department is proud that, as of August 14, 2015, we have implemented two-factor authentication for 78% of general users and 80% of privileged users. Additionally, DOL has developed a corrective action plan to ensure full compliance with two-factor authentication requirements by the end of FY 2015.

This too is deserving of context: Despite OMB's recommendation to increase DOL IT Modernization funding in FY 2015, the budget received from Congress cut the IT Modernization budget by \$4.1M from the FY 2014 Enacted level and \$15.4 from the Department's FY 2015 President's budget request. This lack of funding has directly impacted the ability of DOL to improve its IT security posture, including but not limited to the Identity Access Management project.

Finally, since the PIV two-factor authentication is only a sub-set of the scope of the IAM project, DOL will continue to implement additional Identity Management system objectives in FY 2016.

⁵ It should be noted that the DOL funding constraint impacts on the IAM program were reported in the DOL FY 2014 Portfolio Stat and FY 2015 FedStat reviews.

Third Party Oversight

DOL, like other Federal agencies, faces technical constraints and challenges associated with the realities of the federal contracting process, service level agreements, and frequent cases where contractor proprietary system information limits the ability to physically verify security control implementation. However, the Department does apply standard security language and policies that clearly outline the contractor's responsibility to comply with all federal laws and mandates. Additionally, DOL's compliance review and oversight procedures include the review of DOL contracted systems. To ensure DOL agencies were positioned to address the unique challenges associated with performing security compliance reviews of third party systems, DOL developed and issued the DOL Third Party Security Monitoring Guide on May 11, 2015, and provided further implementation guidance on July 17, 2015. The Guide provides DOL Agencies and Information Security Officers with a uniform and consistent approach to complete oversight reviews and monitor third party/external information system providers. These reviews and associated results will be documented and jointly managed by System Owners and Information Security Officers.

Configuration Management

In reviewing the Department's configuration management control, the OIG has included topics outside the NIST defined scope of configuration management, in some cases even conflating configuration management with vulnerability management observations. That said, several of the OIG's observations are valid, and it is a top priority for management to resolve these issues promptly.

For example, DOL mitigated the impact of its budget constraints by becoming an early adopter of the Department of Homeland Security's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program, and was able to enhance the DOL Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) program by adding more IT security monitoring tools. The DOL ISCM enables DOL to leverage automated tools for near-real time monitoring of DOL assets for vulnerability, configuration and asset inventory management. Further, the ISCM program provides agencies with the ability to automate many of configuration management procedures. As a result of implementing the ISCM program, DOL has experienced a significant decrease in the number of information system vulnerabilities, outstanding security patches, and configuration management shortcomings, indicating that the program is operating effectively. DOL's ISCM program will be further enhanced by the deployment of additional automated monitoring tools by the end of FY 2015.

To ensure that DOL addresses the remaining OIG configuration management issues and proactively strengthens DOL system configurations, the Department will continue the frequent ISCM security assessments and quarterly reporting process, including the issuance of quarterly security dashboards to monitor Agencies' progress in achieving the DOL security requirements. The Department will work with its Agencies to ensure effective corrective actions are identified to address any issues of concern. Corrective actions for all identified weaknesses are documented in the DOL Enterprise Plan of Action and Milestones, to which OIG access has been provided.

If you have any questions, please contact me directly at (202) 693-4200 or have your staff contact Tonya Manning, Chief Information Security Officer at <u>manning.tonya@dol.gov</u> or (202) 693-4431.

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Attachment

cc: T. Michael Kerr, Assistant Secretary, OASAM Ed Hugler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, OASAM Tonya Manning, Chief Information Security Officer, OASAM Keith Galayda, Director, Information Technology Audits, OIG

Report #	Report Name / Date	Recommendation	OIG Status	Source of Status
23-10-001-07-001	Actions Required to	Recommendation 1: Develop an	Recommendation 1 -	Recommendation 1 –
	Resolve Significant	information security and risk-based	Closed, pending OIG	Memorandum from Elliot
[OASAM has a	Deficiencies and Improve	assessment strategy resulting in	verification	Lewis to Michael Kerr –
copy of report]	DOL's Overall IT	identification of system security risks		Updated Status of Prior-
	Security Program Major	and priorities, and develop and link	Recommendation 2 –	Year Recommendations
	Information System	specific policies and procedures to	Closed, pending OIG	Related to Chief
	(March 30, 2010)	those risks and priorities – a roadmap	verification	Information Office IT
		- for component agencies to follow in		Security (July 18, 2011)
	Two references in July 31	fully implementing minimum IT	Recommendation 3 –	
	memorandum	security requirements.	Closed	Recommendation 2 –
		· · ·		Memorandum from Elliot
		Recommendation 2: Target areas of		Lewis to Michael Kerr –
		greatest risk for focused oversight and		Updated Status of Prior-
		timely remediation of identified IT	· · · ·	Year Recommendations
		security program deficiencies.		Related to Chief
				Information Office IT
		Recommendation 3: Develop and	•	Security (July 18, 2011)
		implement monitoring policies and		
		procedures for component agencies to		Recommendation 3 -
		follow in the oversight of third-party		Report No. 23-13-001-07-
		compliance with minimum IT security		720: Verification of Office
		requirements.		of the Chief Information
				Officer Remediation
				Efforts of Prior-Year
				Information Technology
				Security Recommendations
	·		·	(October 4, 2012)
23-11-005-07-001	Significant Deficiencies	Recommendation 1: Ensure	Recommendation 1 -	Recommendation 1 –
	Persist in DOL's	appropriate resources are available to	Resolved	Memorandum from Elliot
[OASAM has a	Information Security	provide effective oversight and		Lewis to Michael Kerr –
copy of report]	Program (September 21,	resolution of recommendations,	Recommendation 2 –	Status of Recommendations
	2011)	including the timely remediation of all	Resolved	for Fiscal year 2010 Audit
		other identified IT security		Report Titled: Significant
	Two references in July 31	deficiencies.		Deficiencies Persist in

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Report #	Report Name / Date	Recommendation	OIG Status	Source of Status
	memorandum	Recommendation 2: Assess the delay		DOL's Information
	· · · ·	in implementing the Risk		Security Program
		Management Compliance Program to		(February 8, 2012)
		ensure it is rolled out timely as an		
		effective tool to assist in managing the		Recommendation 2 -
		IT security program.		Report No. 23-13-001-07-
				720: Verification of Office
				of the Chief Information
				Officer Remediation
				Efforts of Prior-Year
				Information Technology
				Security Recommendations
				(October 4, 2012) &
	-			Memorandum from Elliot
				Lewis to Michael Kerr –
	· ·			Verification of OCIO
		•		Remediation Efforts for
				Prior-Year Information
			-	Technology Security
		·		Recommendations, Report
				# 23-14-001-07-725
				(March 31, 2014)
23-12-002-07-001	Federal Information	Recommendation 1: For the	Recommendation 1 -	Recommendation 1 –
	Security Management Act	significant deficiencies, create a Plan	Resolved	Memorandum from Elliot
OASAM has a	Departmental Security	of Action and Milestones with the		Lewis to Michael Kerr –
copy of report]	Issues (March 19, 2012)	highest priority in describing and	Recommendation 2-	Verification of OCIO
		implementing mitigation strategies	Resolved	Remediation Efforts for
	·	and describe corrective actions having		Prior-Year Information
		aggressive (immediate or near-		Technology Security
		immediate) milestone dates for		Recommendations, Report
		correcting the three significant		# 23-14-001-07-725
		deficiencies access controls,		(March 31, 2014)
		background investigations, and		
		oversight of third party systems to		Recommendation 2-

Report #	Report Name / Date	Recommendation	OIG Status	Source of Status
		ensure integrity, confidentiality and		Memorandum from Elliot
		availability of information.		Lewis to Michael Kerr -
-				Verification of OCIO
		Recommendation 2: For the other		Remediation Efforts for
		deficiencies, created a POA&M for		Prior-Year Information
		describing and implementing		Technology Security
		mitigation strategies and describe		Recommendations, Report
		corrective actions having milestone		# 23-14-001-07-725
		dates for correcting the three		(March 31, 2014)
		deficiencies: risk management,		
		continuous monitoring, and		
		contingency planning to ensure		
		integrity, confidentiality and		
23-12-009-07-001	DOL Needs to Take	availability of information. Recommendation 1: Establish a	Recommendation 1 –	Memorandum from Elliot
23-12-009-07-001	Immediate Action to	prioritized corrective action plan,	Resolved	Lewis to Michael Kerr –
OASAM has	Correct Security	including milestones, detailing within	Resolveu	Resolution Status of
response to OIG]	Weaknesses in the	5 days that a detailed strategy to	Recommendation 2-	Information Technology
	(September 7,	reduce or eliminate the related risks.	Resolved	Recommendations (June
	2012)			12, 2013)
		Recommendation 2: Ensure system		
		owners receive the training they need		
		to meet their responsibilities.		
23-12-007-07-001	Department's Information	Recommendation 1: Lead	Recommendation 1 -	Memorandum from Elliot
	Technology Security	prioritization of agencies' remediation	Closed, pending OIG	Lewis to Michael Kerr –
[OASAM has	Program is Weakened by	of the significant deficiencies	verification	Resolution Status of
copy of response	Deficiencies (September	identified by completing		Information Technology
to OIG]	27, 2012)	implementation of its planned, risk-		Recommendations (June
		based management and compliance		12, 2013)
		program DOL-wide.		
23-13-008-07-001	Department's Information	Recommendation: Reassess and	Recommendation 1 –	August 14, 2015 email
50 4 0 4 0 f 1	Technology Security	establish DOL agencies' remediation	Closed, pending OIG	from Elliot Lewis to Ed
[OASAM has a	Program is Weakened by	priorities of the identified significant	verification	Hugler
copy of report]	Deficiencies (March 29,	deficiencies to minimize risks to		

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OIG IT Security Concerns Crosswalk

Report #	Report Name / Date	Recommendation	OIG Status	Source of Status
	2013)	confidentiality, integrity, and		
		availability of information and		
	Two references in July 31	information systems.		
	memorandum			
		Note: Recommendation cites 23-12-		
		009-07-001 (above)		
23-15-001-07-725	Cyber Security Program	Recommendation 1: Establish third-	Pending formal	August 14, 2015 email
	Improvements Are	party oversight/monitoring processes	response from OIG to	from Elliot Lewis to Ed
[OASAM has a	Needed to Better Secure	and tools that guide information	management's	Hugler
copy of report]	DOL's Major Information	system owners on how to better	response of March	
·····]	System (March 31, 2015)	monitor third-party service providers'	27, 2015 to draft	
		effectiveness in implementing NIST	report	
	Three references in July	information security requirements and	P	
	31 memorandum	Administration priorities.		
		rummistation promites.		
		Recommendation 2: Increase the		
		OCIO's oversight, testing, and		
		verification of DOL's cyber security		
		program related to the Vulnerability		
		and Configuration Management		
	_	Significant Deficiency.		
		Significant Deficiency.		
	-	Recommendation 3: Increase the		
		OCIO's oversight, testing, and		
		verification of DOL's cyber security		
		program related to Contingency		
		Planning / Disaster Recovery.		
		Flammig / Disaster Recovery.		
		Recommendation 4: Increase the		
		OCIO's oversight, testing, and		
		verification of DOL's cyber security		
		program related to Access		
-		Management.		

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Report #	Report Name / Date	Recommendation	OIG Status	Source of Status
		Recommendation 5: Conduct better		
		oversight of DOL's information		
		technology asset and incident response		
		management areas to prevent		
		unauthorized and unmanaged devices		
		from handling DOL information and		
		to ensure all incidents are timely		
		reported to CSIRC and US-CERT.		

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